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Journal Articles Acta Biotheoretica Year : 2008

On physicalism and downward causation in developmental and cancer biology

Abstract

The dominant position in Philosophy of Science contends that downward causation is an illusion. Instead, we argue that downward causation doesn't introduce vicious circles either in physics or in biology. We also question the metaphysical claim that "physical facts fix all the facts." Downward causation does not imply any contradiction if we reject the assumption of the completeness and the causal closure of the physical world that this assertion contains. We provide an argument for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, this allows us to reconsider the concept of diachronic emergence.
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Dates and versions

hal-00714937 , version 1 (30-08-2013)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00714937 , version 1

Cite

Ana M. Soto, Sonnenschein Carlos, Paul-Antoine Miquel. On physicalism and downward causation in developmental and cancer biology. Acta Biotheoretica, 2008, 56 (4), pp.257-274. ⟨hal-00714937⟩
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